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Abstract 
Human spatial perception is how we understand places. Beyond understanding what 
is where (William James’ formulation of the psychological approach to perception); 
there are holistic qualities to places. We perceive places as busy, crowded, exciting, 
threatening or peaceful, calm, comfortable and so on. Designers of places spend a 
great deal of time and effort on these qualities; scientists rarely do. In the scientific 
world-view physical qualities and our emotive responses to them are neatly divided in 
the objective-subjective dichotomy. 
In this context, music has traditionally constituted an item in a place. 
Over the last two decades, development of “spatial music” has been within the 
prevailing engineering paradigm, informed by psychophysical data; here, space is an 
abstract, Euclidean 3-dimensional ‘container’ for events. The emotional consequence 
of spatial arrangements is not the main focus in this approach. 
This paper argues that a paradigm shift is appropriate, from ‘music-in-a-place’ to 
‘music-as-a-place’ requiring a fundamental philosophical realignment of ‘meaning’ 
away from subjective response to include consequences-in-the-environment. Hence 
the hegemony of the subjective-objective dichotomy is questioned. There are 
precedents for this, for example in the ecological approach to perception (Gibson). An 
ecological approach to music-as-environment intrinsically treats the emotional 
consequences of spatio-musical arrangement holistically. A simplified taxonomy of 
the attributes of artificial spatial sound in this context will be discussed. 
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The emotional contents of the ‘space’ in spatial music 
 Introduction and Context 
Current technologies permit increasingly fine control of “three-dimensionality” in 
sound, in terms of phantom images’ perceptible directionality from a specified 
listening position. It is possible to place images almost
1
 anywhere on the surface of a 
sphere surrounding the listener. Image-movement controls are fairly rudimentary, 
descended from stereo panoramic potentiometers (“panpots”) that vary inter channel 
relationships in amplitude (and sometimes phase-), thus manipulating listeners’ 
interaural differences. Distance, range or proximity (whichever term is used to 
describe the separateness between perceiver and phantom source) is less well served, 
as are changes in proximity (approaching or departing). Synthesised sound fields can 
lack something related to “realism”. It is also possible, using microphones such as 
Soundfield ™, Tetramic™ to capture a signal set that describes a full circular or even 
spherical sound field in a real environment. Whilst these microphones fall far short of 
the mathematically higher orders of resolution feasible through synthetic means, they 
can exhibit that elusive almost-tangible realism. Naturally, it is feasible to engineer 
hybrids where a “found sound field” can provide a container place within which 
synthesised or individually captured items can be sited, giving a holistic and natural-
sounding environment yet with precisely locatable components. 
Meanwhile, software for sound field control, scene-description protocols for audio 
and audio-visual spatial displays, along with storage and transmission technologies, 
                                                
1
 Directly below the listener is still a problem 
International Conference on Music and Emotion, (Durham, UK) September 2009 
Page 4 of 21 
are evolving rapidly, driven by the growing ubiquity of domestic surround sound for 
film, TV and computer games. 
Unsurprisingly, some composers are interested in notions of a paradigm shift using 
“space” as a direct musical parameter – not simply arranging musical sources around 
the listener, but utilising the full range of spatial attributes available to us in real 
environments. This raises many questions: is space musically meaningful at all? And 
if it is, how will space fit in with existing theories of music cognition? For that matter, 
what is “space”? Is it unitary or divisible? (If the former, it hardly seems possible to 
parameterise it, if the latter, what distinctions form the basis of parameterisation?) 
For composers, the current situation is exciting and frustrating in equal measure. On 
the one hand, they might be eager to escape the constraints imposed by consumer 
technologies and formats; on the other hand, they are reliant on them for 
dissemination. With notable exceptions, music technologies for public concerts fall 
short of what is theoretically feasible (understandably; who would install a system for 
which no material exists, and who would compose for a similarly nonexistent 
system?). Particularly frustrating is that the detailed, exciting and no doubt 
magnificent spatio-musical imaginings are locked in the composer’s mind, there is no 
intuitive and transparent conduit for externalising them and the media for their 
expression is currently “under construction” 
The result is that spatial music must be laboriously and painstakingly constructed 
using tools that are not task specific; spontaneity, intuition and “feeling” are difficult 
to preserve in this way of working. This can result in a cerebral, analytical –even 
unemotional- approach to spatial composition. 
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This paper examines the philosophical and metaphorical constraints on 3 dimensional 
music development. 
 Artificial Space: intrinsic philosophies and metaphors  
Technology is at present covert philosophy; the point is to make it openly philosophical (Agre 
1997 p.240) 
Ultimately, all technologies feature embedded metaphors and are grounded on some 
axiomatic philosophical approach. When we press an onscreen ‘button’ we aren’t 
really– we’re issuing a ‘command’ to initiate a complex set of processing 
procedures… it’s just ‘dressed up’ as a button to provide what Kahneman and 
Tversky called ‘intuitive accessibility’ (Kahneman 2002). When we turn a radio’s 
volume up or down, the vertical spatial reference is metaphorical. It is interesting to 
note how many metaphors refer to spatial behaviours and the egocentric reference 
frame [Campbell 1993). For a detailed discussion of Metaphor Theory see (Lakoff 
and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1993)    
The underlying concepts of “space” might insidiously differ between one 
technological implementation and another. For instance, in domestic music 
technologies, the perceiver is conceptualised as a static, passive receiver, sitting quite 
still in a known position. This simplifies the signal control problem enormously, even 
though actually, very few perceivers are so fortunate or well behaved (in a car, no-one 
is ever seated in the ‘correct’ place). Computer gamers, on the other hand, tolerate 
quite poor-quality sound, but as long as the spatial audio aspects are consistent with 
their activities as a moving (virtually), behaving and exploring individual, they report 
an increased sense of ‘presence’ in the artificial environment. 
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 Space: the engineering approach. 
In engineering terms, space just objectively is, irrespective of my (or anyone else’s) 
opinions. It is Euclidean, 3-dimensional and non-value-weighted. “Things” therein are 
measurable but not intrinsically big or small. Spatiality isn’t quite the same kind of 
property as taste or colour (where the perceiver contributes a subjective element to the 
percept). To exist is to be spatial, and vice versa; a thing is spatially extended and 
located. 
To engineer an artificial space, then, one has to control the smallest elements of which 
that space is made – the pixels, particles, waves, nodes or whatever- over the 
nominated display area that the percipient will experience. Finer control over smaller 
elements means “higher definition” with the concomitant assumption that the result 
will be more perceptually satisfying. 
Spatial perception: an engineering problem 
For the purposes of the present discussion, auditory spatial perception is conceived as 
itself a ‘signal processing’ problem, the perceiver apprehends signals (modulated 
energy flows) in just such a manner as to preserve the signal characteristics that 
physically correlate to the relevant
2
 spatial attributes in the environment. The degree 
to which this is achieved is a matter of “spatial acuity”, and of course, the degree to 
which there is a match between the resolution of a display system (the “high 
definition” of the previous paragraph) and the spatial acuity of the perceiver is the 
                                                
2
 Relevant to cognitive processing and behavioural capacities and, supposedly, survival needs 
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degree to which a system has efficiently met requirements. In other words, higher-
than-perceptible definition would be a waste of system resources. 
This way of thinking could be simplistically blocked out as follows: 
1. A sound field (characterisation of energy field at point of measurement) is 
presented to: 
2. Sensory receptors, which sample the field, producing: 
3. Transduction to neural analogue, representing key features prior to: 
4. Cognitive processing to improve signal-to-noise ratio for salient features, then: 
5. Higher cognition to understand meaning, attachment of emotional labels 
This is a computational model of perception, where “meaning” is wholly intrinsic to 
the perceiver, is part of the description (of an external state of affairs) that comes into 
the equation at the end, after much computation – it is part of how we understand, 
through subjective weighting, aspects of our environment. This is classical Cartesian 
dualism wherein the interactions between physical universe and the mind are 
essentially mysterious and curiously indirect, mediated by layers of sensory and 
perceptual processing that progressively contaminate information with subjective self-
interest. 
In this conceptualisation, where value-weighting is assigned by the perceiver, the 
spatial distinctions in the environment are non-arbitrary, whereas those in perception 
are arbitrary. Hence, the fact that a perceiver can detect one feature but not another is 
attributed to inaccuracy in terms of acuity; perception is always less than perfect. 
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Unfortunately, artificial environments are similarly incomplete (by definition!) and so 
the spatial distinctions in this kind of environment must be arbitrarily parameterised 
to match perceivers’ available distinctions. Engineers aim for “…as accurately as 
possible…” but it is really an impossible task, like chasing infinity.  
Currently, artificial sound fields suffer the following constraints: 
3. They are generally single room affairs and so not very ‘explorable’ (there are 
no very large artificial sound environments that perceivers could explore for 
hours or even days).  
4. They are not nearly as richly detailed as real audible environments 
5. Since we don’t fully understand human spatial perception, we don’t know how 
to compose for it, play with it, confound it. 
6. There is little relevant aesthetic theory or practise of spatial sound 
7. Empty, abstract, Euclidean space is dull and lifeless, rather like architectural 
drawings that have no people in them. 
Many of these constraints come about simply because the technology has necessarily 
been driven (almost exclusively) by engineering concerns and problems, coupled with 
the spate of rapid evolution in digital technologies. Systems are complex to learn (and 
iron out the bugs) and quickly become redundant (often accompanied by the demise 
of the manufacturer and the cessation of technical support). Composers and musicians 
have had to become programmers, engineers, technicians before they can explore the 
aesthetic ‘wild territory’, subverting perceptual rules and driving technology forward 
International Conference on Music and Emotion, (Durham, UK) September 2009 
Page 9 of 21 
with impossible demands. Listening to some of those composers who have thought 
about what spatial music might be like, I’m struck by the observation that the kinds of 
spatial behaviours they hear in their imagination and would like to incorporate are 
nothing like what is currently available. They speak of swarming, flying, bouncing 
coalescing, interacting, trajectories, call and response over great distances, huge 
spaces, waterfalls of sound, almost tangible yet abstract items moving very close then 
zooming far away and so on. 
This is not to belittle the impressive results of the Cartesian engineering approach, not 
least because it’s the only game in town, but given that the spatial characteristics 
available to composers must be arbitrary, a broader philosophical view will pay 
dividends. 
Spatial perception: a problem for real people 
An alternative approach casts spatial perception as a subset of place perception, 
whereby perception did not evolve to grasp abstract, empty space or objective reality 
or perfect Platonic forms; Euclidean space is an evolutionary latecomer to our 
cognition. 
“The doctrine that we could not perceive the world around us unless we already had 
the concept of space is nonsense. It is quite the other way round: We could not 
conceive of empty space unless we could see the ground under our feet and the sky 
above. Space is a myth, a ghost, a fiction for geometers.”  (Gibson, 1979 p. 3). 
In Gibson’s Ecological Approach, perception, cognition and action are indivisible. 
Cognition is necessarily embodied (see Lakoff 1993 for this view) so that perception 
and that-which-is-perceived (environment) are intertwined. See also Jarvilehto (1998) 
on the perceiver-environment system. 
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In this way of thinking, real places are intuitively accessible (as in Kahneman’s 2002 
description) precisely because the physical regularities and distinctions in them have 
shaped the species and the individual- our phylogenetic and ontogenetic development. 
“Perception” isn’t inaccurate, subjective, biased, a poor-quality rendering of ‘perfect’ 
reality. Perception evolved (over millions of years) in a universe suffused with 
consequences: threats, opportunities. Meanings are not simply imaginary constructs, 
they exist in the environment. This question of what meaning is, is brought into focus 
in Victor Rosenthal’s formulation of Microgenesis, 
It should be noted that form, meaning and value are not considered separate or independent 
entities. According to microgenetic theory, whatever acquires the phenomenological status of 
individuated form acquires, ipso facto, value and meaning. (Rosenthal, V., 2002) 
The consequence of taking the view that meanings are not solely intrinsic to the 
perceiver is that we can accept that reasonably useful perception can take place when 
the signals available to sensation are in some way impoverished, or even when there 
is so much detail available that perception must somehow choose what to process 
prior to comprehension – the familiar “attention” problem. Perception is essentially 
non-linear, always must proceed on the basis of incomplete data (to arrive at good 
solutions in timely fashion), and the appropriate ‘bits’ of the incoming sensory signals 
must be rapidly sorted and assigned to a representational scenario that most resembles 
the important factors in the real world. This might seem an impossible task, since 
often, the ‘bits’ of the incoming sense-stream that represent different meanings in the 
world, are physically conflated. In hearing, for example, the spectral consequences of 
source content, and those due to source location are physically conflated in the signals 
at the eardrum – the ‘what-and-where’ problem. Nevertheless, we know that it is 
possible since we do achieve it. 
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Let us assume that all sensation carries information; the sensory field is always 
heterogeneous, patterned. Every single signal that impinges on a receptor is 
meaningful – but some meanings are more important than others, and some are more 
urgent. The supposition, then, is that there are natural hierarchies of causal 
significance, which are target items for mechanisms that analyse for perceptual 
significance. (Lennox and Myatt 2006) It is important to recognise that it cannot be 
necessary to understand the entirety of an environment to understand any of it. Hence, 
one could understand that something is moving without understanding what it is, or 
even where it is – these understandings can follow the raw recognition of something-
moving. 
Perception, then, is non-linear – and a good thing too. It has evolved to apprehend 
items of causal significance (meanings) in the world, by detecting and even 
exaggerating the physical aspects of incoming signals that correlate with those 
meanings. Perception is primarily identification and prediction; the conversion of 
sense data to meaningful-information-about-the-environment is crucial, but only a 
small part of that. 
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A prospective categorisation of items for hierarchical organisation based on the 
distinctions in real environments is as follows: 
 
Entities, non-entities, events and relationships,  
1. Entities are either corporeal or ethereal. 
Ethereal: ‘an idea’, ‘a sound,’ ‘an event’ ‘a collection’ or ‘association’. 
Corporeal: ‘things’ or ‘features’.  
Things: organisms or objects 
 Organisms: Prey, predator, ally, competitor or crowd. 
 Objects: Tools, weapons, food 
Features (‘entities of potential facility’): 
Obstacle, trap (self or other), shelter (hide behind/under), way 
(gap, doorway path, escape, gain access), vantage point (safe, 
remote viewing) 
2. Non-entities 
Formless Substance e.g.: air 
(Perceptual) Background: collection of uninteresting/non-urgent items (e.g.-
grains of sand) 
Place: container in which action takes place 
3. Events 
Bounded: sequence of changes involving cause, process and effect. 
  Ongoing processes: causal sequence without discernable boundary. 
4. Relationships: 
Near / far: Within reach/ can reach ‘me’, or not. Affects ‘perceptual  
significance’ of items. 
Nearer /further than in comparison with other salient item(s) 
Moving: Signifies entity, possibly animate. 
Change of movement –acceleration/ direction; good signifier of 
organism-hood. Predictions require frequent updates. 
Coming / going: Threat or reward, imminent or receding 
Passing: Salient change of significance, from ‘coming’ to ‘going’. 
Facing-ness: Characteristic of entities that facilitates prediction; can be a 
good signifier of organisms’ intentions. 
  
(Lennox 2006) 
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It is obvious that these categories must interact; for example a large thing exhibiting 
organism-like behaviour, moving fast, towards me, potentially requires immediate 
action and is correspondingly likely to command attention in a way that causes me to 
ignore features of lesser urgency. Equally, in the absence of such urgent call-to-
action, I can pay more detailed attention to very fine distinctions; for example, an 
interesting picture, a flower, a tiny almost-imperceptible sound. 
 Composing spatial music as an artificial environment 
An important observation drawn from teaching in this subject area is that most 
people, most of the time, do not actually listen to sound environments. They hear 
things in places, near or far, behind or in front of something, coming, just moving or 
even stationary. Many of the items that figure in their perception are not represented 
in ‘consciousness’; people don’t hear them, they are just there. The obstacles such as 
buildings and trees that provide occlusions and reflective surfaces with which the 
sounds of everyday sources interact form a kind of unreported perceptual background. 
This is surely not a case of a perceptual deficiency; the deliberate ignoring of specific 
‘classes’ of information in order to free up attention for others, is a complex 
accomplishment; I think of this as “selective inattention” (Lennox 2006). The causally 
less significant items and features in the world are suppressed until it seems that they 
are unheard – this is an example of the hierarchy of perceptual significance (Lennox 
Myatt and Vaughan 1999) matching the prevailing causal significance. In “normal” 
perception, we each do this apparently effortlessly, all day. It is after all, the faculty 
that has been shaped by many millions of years’ exposure to the causal regularities of 
the world. 
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Nevertheless, when it comes to examining the constituents of real soundscapes, 
Kahneman’s intuitive accessibility is problematic. I have had a group of postgraduate 
students insist that there are no echoes in a forest – that all acoustic energies are 
scattered and/or absorbed. This was because they took their knowledge from a 
textbook rather than a forest; a short trip to the countryside resolved the argument. 
I sent a group of undergraduate students out on sound walks to listen to soundscapes. 
In spite of me giving detailed instructions on how to actually listen to the world rather 
than be deafened by one’s own noise, most were reluctant to turn off their phone, it 
wasn’t obvious to them that they shouldn’t wear noisy clothing, or have their hood up. 
Some tried to walk around the route in a group, chatting, and one came back with an 
mp3 player on! Naturally, all were unimpressed by the soundscapes they had just 
experienced (or failed to experience). I sent the same students out in small groups 
with a Soundfield ™ ambisonic 3-D microphone and 4-track digital recorder, to 
record at various points along the route. We auditioned the results in our spatial sound 
lab which is suitably equipped with ambisonic decoders and 24 speakers arranged on 
the surface of a nominal sphere. They were astonished at how much the recording had 
picked up that they hadn’t heard, how loud the background sound was and conversely, 
how indistinct some items were that they thought they had heard perfectly well. The 
students subsequently revisited the original soundwalk task and almost all returned 
surprised reports of being able to hear buildings, parked cars, passing openings and so 
on. The main impediments were said to be traffic noise and fans – extractor fans, 
heating fans, and air conditioning vents. It seems, as some have said (see, for 
instance: Schafer, 1969, and Truax 1996) our perceptual capacity to ignore the 
background comes at a price, we are generating the sonic equivalent of litter.  
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The lesson from the above experiences is that sometimes, abstraction is required, so 
that by rendering real soundscapes into the artificial domain, we can usefully gain 
information about the real world. Effectively, we are re-tuning and elaborating 
perception. This may the fundament reason for engaging in any abstract thought. 
In supposing that an artificial environment must essentially be benign, the actual full 
range of causal significance (from inconsequential to immediate and severe threat) 
cannot be available; health and safety legislation and ethical considerations simply 
prohibit that. However, in the principle that perceptual significance can ‘scale’ to the 
immediate environment, the ‘dynamic range’ of perceptual experience is not 
necessarily curtailed; very fine distinctions can be entertained. Indeed, this must be 
the principle at work in our enjoyment of fictional environments such as music, film, 
reading and games.  
Given that: things, features and place characteristics have causal attributes that cause 
perception to define them as such, it follows that their treatment in artificial sound 
fields must preserve those characteristics so that the environment exhibits an ecology 
consisting of items of more and less importance, changes in relationships, and causal 
progressions that accord with some “internal causal connectedness” that can facilitate 
perceptual anticipation (and occasional surprise!). That is to say, everything cannot be 
ultimately random at every scale, or the result will be perceptually uninteresting. 
Everything cannot be of maximal importance, nor can items be fundamentally 
unrelated. 
This is not to say that spatial music must be slavishly spatially-realistic; we know 
from experience of cartoons and animated desk lamps (Pixar 1986) that literal realism 
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is not necessary. Likewise, we know that spatial music will not all be the same, will 
not even feature the same entities, items or rules. However, inasmuch as there are 
rules, it would be useful if these were technologically implemented in transparent 
ways; this means that the control surfaces should metaphorically resemble the 
operation to be carried out. 
The modular nature of modern digital audio technologies is useful, not least because 
currently, we tend to conceptualise perception itself as modular. That is, specialised 
processing subsystems ‘concentrate’ on certain types of task, feature or process. 
Without wishing to review the whole of the literature on brain region specialisation, 
Fodor’s view on low-level modularity (Fodor 1985), ‘what and where’ processing 
systems (Atkinson 1993, pp 325-339), (Ungerleider and Mishkin 1982), the view 
espoused here is that perceptual context modules (Lennox 2006) are specialised to 
engage with understanding, tracking changes and generating predictions of specific 
causal features. So, for instance, a system that is “interested” in the intentions and 
behaviour of organisms would command attention (i.e. maximal processing resources] 
if an organism is nearby. A system that monitors “things coming toward me” (in 
vision this is referred to as visual looming (Franconeri and Simons, 2003), in audition, 
auditory looming (Rosenblum, Wuestefeld, and Saldaña, 1993) will cooperate with 
the intention monitoring system in sequestering attention-resources. Meanwhile, the 
system that subtracts background helps to improve matters by removing “noise” (i.e. 
unwanted signal) from the forum of attention; in audition, dynamic precedence effect 
mechanisms operate, so that the directional information linked to sonic reflections is 
suppressed in favour of a directional conclusion dominated by the first-received 
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example of a sound: the ‘direct’ sound from the source itself (for a comprehensive 
description, see: Litovsky et al1999) 
Hence, specialised spatial sound controls could be constructed so as to appeal 
specifically to evolved perceptual mechanisms for organism, object, place, movement, 
location in place, approaching, departing etc.  
Plausibility rests with the constraints one places on the dedicated control. For 
instance, a human voice cannot come from several places at once, unless it is to be 
perceived as coming from a speaker system. Introducing small time delays around the 
multi-channel speaker array makes it sound as though one is sharing a reverberant 
environment with the person because these sound like acoustic reflections (about 
20ms would be equivalent to a reflected sound wave having travelled 6.6 metres 
further than the direct path). It makes more sense to have a background “place 
management module” that gives the overall sound of a place of specified size, shape, 
reflectivity, clutter. Individual items can be positioned by a location module, or 
moved by a movement module. Things should move coherently and plausibly (few 
things can hop from one location to another without being detected en route, and a 
given thing can only move so fast and has finite acceleration). Many surround sound 
technologies currently feature circular panners; this is fine for choosing a particular 
location for a static source, but is ludicrous as a dynamic control. Things do not move 
in circles unless they are on the end of a piece of string or otherwise constrained, they 
tend to move in a straight line. The chief ubiquitous constraint that has shaped the 
environments we inhabit is gravity, so things bounce, bump, scrape and roll. Most 
things have mass and therefore weight. A thing that can maintain distance from the 
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ground must be able to do so for a reason, and this reason should be perceptually 
discernable. Things do not start and stop moving for no reason – they are either 
moved by an agent or are agents themselves – and the movement in the two cases is 
likely to be different (irregular changes in direction and acceleration usually signify 
organic agency). Things do not inexplicably change size, come into or go out of being 
without explanation, things exhibit continuity of identity. 
Of course, these don’t sound like musical rules, they are the regularities of 
environments. Like the physics engines used in computer games, designing a 
‘perceptual engine’ that utilises the intuitive and inbuilt distinctions we deploy in acts 
of spatial perception can simplify operations. 
Developing a complete and prescriptive taxonomy of operations might not be useful 
at this stage, since the contention here is that the aesthetic ‘rules’ cannot be decided 
before the fact, and certainly cannot be decided without the creative input of 
composers and musicians. The selective confounding of perceptual expectations by 
varying parameters (so that a thing can dissolve into a hundred audible fragments, 
then coalesce into a different thing, for instance) is what spatial music will entail. 
What is important is that music that the listener can be inside; this music-as-an-
environment doesn’t just immerse them in a thick blanket of sound, nor should it rely 
simply on arranging sources around a listener. This artificial environment should be 
able to engage the occupants’ attention, inattention, anticipation and feelings. We 
must accept that the feelings we have about places are not merely due to subjective 
responses brought about by operant conditioning; places do have intrinsic character 
and emotional engagement is the proper response to place. 
International Conference on Music and Emotion, (Durham, UK) September 2009 
Page 19 of 21 
 Conclusions 
For best results, spatiality cannot simply be ‘added on’ to music (though doubtless 
that is how we get started). What is needed is to make explicit a coherent philosophy 
of the psychology of perception in an artificial spatial auditory environment. Sounds 
cannot exist in splendid isolation; they form part of an ecosystem of interdependent 
relationships. The tools for managing such an ecology barely exist, and their 
development cannot rest with engineers alone. Input is required from philosophers, 
psychologists and especially, artists.  
In a small way, at the University of Derby we have initiated an attempt to bridge the 
gap between disciplines by creating the Derby Laptop Orchestra (DLO), which is a 
true 3-d sound environment for aesthetic, perceptual and technological 
experimentation.  Whilst we work with, and contribute to the development of, some 
of the most advanced spatial sound techniques currently in existence, we are aware 
that we are at the very beginning of a huge and explosive growth, a veritable 
revolution that will soon make today’s technologies seem like toys. The really 
impressive developments, though, will be in the aesthetics of this new medium. 
We work with composers, psychologists, musicians, technologists, sound recordists, 
DJs, a professional audio company, geographers, architects, even a historian to 
explore matters of meaning in spatial sound. Naturally, whilst resources are 
necessarily limited, we welcome opportunities for further exploration. 
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